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I. INTRODUCTION
As the nineteenth century began, American states adhered to the
English common law rules governing the property rights of married
women.1 The doctrine of marital unity or coverture was the basis of
married women's property rights at common law,2 meaning, "covered
* Joseph Anthony Custer, Asst. Prof of Law, Director, Saint Louis University Law Library. Author
thanks the Saint Louis Law Faculty Workshop for some excellent suggestions on the paper. Author also
thanks wife, Brenda Smith-Custer, for her careful reading and formatting expertise, Peter Schanck,
long-time mentor and friend for his careful read and thoughtful suggestions, and Faculty Fellow, Dan
Rankin, for his research and editing.
1. See MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA xi-xvii
(1986); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA ix-xii (1985); JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF
U.S. WOMEN 1-6 (1991).
2. Suzanne D. Lebsock, Radical Reconstruction and the Property Rights of Southern Women,
43 J. S. Hist. 195, 209 (1977) ("Georgia wives were not granted legal control over their own earnings
until 1943").
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woman." 3 This was the simple presumption that "in the eyes of the law" the
husband and wife were one person-the husband.4 As Blackstone wrote,
"the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband : under whose wing, protection and cover, she performs everything
"15
Under the common law, single women held the same legal property
rights as men, but married women were not allowed to act independently
with regard to property.6 Upon marriage, real property owned by a woman
in a legal estate was subject to the management and control of her husband,
while her personal property became his.
7
Most Americans in early settlements simply wanted to recreate what
was familiar to them; legislators and judges usually deviated from English
law only in response to novel legal problems that English common law did
not specifically deal. 8 Depending on the area of the country, however, there
still existed levels of diversity in the development of the law. 9 States and
regions varied in how they adopted local customs and the common law. 10
Similar to England, some Northern states had courts of equity empathetic to
women.II
In early America, each jurisdiction originally based its legal system on
England's, but no two states evolved in the same way.12 With the exception
of equity court decisions, advancement in married women's property rights
did not happen in the first three decades. 13 Finally, in the late 1830s and
early 1840s, married women's property acts began to be passed, but there
was no immediate equality for married women.
14
3. Kerry Abrams, Citizen Spouse, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 407, 415 (2013).
4. NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 224-32 (1982).
5. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 441 (St. George
Tucker ed., 1803).
6. SALMON, supra note 1, at xv.
7. Richard H. Chused, Late Nineteenth Century Married Women's Property Law: Reception of
the Early Married Women 's Property Acts by Courts and Legislatures, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 3, 3
(1985).
8. SALMON, supra note 1, at 3-4.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 12.
12. Id. at 3-5.
13. BASCH, supra note 4, at 226; see also generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered
Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909
(1987).
14. Linda E. Speth, The Married Women's Property Acts, 1839-1865: Reform, Reaction, or
Revolution?, in 2 WOMEN AND THE LAW: A SOCIAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 69-70 (D. Kelly
Weisberg ed., 1982); see BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION
TO THE CIVIL WAR 459 (1957); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 185 (1973).
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Lawrence Freidman wrote that married women's property acts attacked
inequality "piecemeal."' 5 Richard Chused took the piecemeal changes of
the married women's property acts in America and indexed and classified
them into three main waves. 6 The first wave was created largely in
response to two factors: a formidable social reform movement and a
depressed economy in the wake of the Panic of 1837.'7 States created acts
intended to protect the property women obtained through gift or inheritance
against irresponsible husbands and their creditors. 
18
This first wave left traditional marital estate rules and coverture largely
untouched.' 9 The second wave is probably the most famous wave of acts
because New York led the way.2 ° The second phase was marked by the
1848 Seneca Falls Convention.2' While this second wave of acts
established separate estates for women,
2 2 it still left coverture untouched.
2 3
The majority of the third wave of acts were passed after the Civil War.
24
The third wave finally did away with the Medieval institution of coverture.25
This paper concentrates on three states that enacted married women's
property acts during the nineteenth century: Mississippi, New York, and
Oregon.26 Each state, starting with Mississippi, enacted acts that reflect a
different wave.27 While Chused's indexing and classification schema have
been groundbreaking and extremely helpful in providing order and a basic
understanding of what types of married women's property acts were passed
and when in the nineteenth century, in my opinion he did not clearly
provide any underlying explanation or "why" for the passage of the acts.28
15. Id.
16. Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1398-
99(1983).
17. Id. at 1400; see also HAMMOND, supra note 14, at 459 (attributing crisis to erratic American
banking policy and real estate bubble).
18. Chused, supra note 16, at 1403, 1410-11 & n. 267.
19. Id. at 1398.
20. Id. at 1359.
21. Id.; WHERE WOMEN VOTE (1897), microformed on Research Publ'ns, Inc., Fiche 9423,
(Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Coll., Cambridge, Mass.). This was the first organized women's
convention in America held in the state of New York where a series of resolutions favoring women were
adopted. Fifty years later all of the resolutions had been legislated with the exception of suffrage.
22. Chused, supra note 16, at 1359; Mary L. Heen, From Coverture to Contract: Endangering
Insurance on Lives, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 335, 363 n. 172 (2011).
23. Chused, supra note 16, at 1398.
24. Id.; Inara K. Scott, A Window for Change: Conflicting Ideologies and Legal Reforms in Late
Nineteenth-Century Oregon, 37 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 433, 445 (2001) (noting the exception of
Massachusetts, which eliminated coverture in 1855, and Oregon, which eliminated coverture in 1859).
25. Chused, supra note 16, at 1398.
26. See infra Part IllI-IV.
27. See infra Part IlI.A-C.
28. See Chused, supra note 16, at 1398-1400.
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This is not taking anything away from Chusad's substantial contribution,
but does present an opportunity to explore for an explanation.
Several authors have used his classification to provide order to their
discussion of the nineteenth century acts, providing substantial authority to
his scholarship.29 Indeed, my paper is yet another example of the impact of
Chused's schema. My contention is that underlying considerations should
be explored, such as the ideology of the judges who ruled to support the
acts, that may shed more light on the "why" of passage in the Nineteenth
Century. I narrowed my focus to just one state from each of the three waves
with the hope that this more focused analysis of just three states may
provide the better vehicle to deeper analyze a state to find possible
underlying considerations for an explanation.
This paper begins with a brief section, Part II, on early America and
social reform that provides a background on why these acts happened when
they did in American history. 30  There is nothing particularly novel
regarding this section, as it has been written before by different scholars.
Borrowing from the scholars, I intend to use this section as a foundation.
Next, I move to Part III, describing what happened in the three states that
led to the eventual passage of the married women's property acts.3' Part IV
reviews both the legislative and judicial response to passage in each state. 2
In the next section, Part V, I borrow from the scholarly literature of the
political science of the courts.33
Biological information on judges presented in Parts III and IV provides
the basis for a qualitative narrative in Part V.34 My intent in Part V is to
examine certain personal characteristics of judges that proved probative in
the political science scholarly literature covering 20th century judges to
ascertain whether these same characteristics were probative to the 19th
century judges who ruled to support the married women's property acts.35 I
was fortunate to find biographical information on the 19th century judges
who wrote the majority opinions.
29. Ellen Dannin, Marriage and Law Reform: Lessons from the Nineteenth-Century Michigan
Married Women's Property Acts, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 6 (2010); Janet D. Ritsko, Comment, Lien
Times in Massachusetts: Tenancy by the Entirety after Coracecio v. Lowell Five Cents Savings Bank, 30
NEW ENG. L. REV. 85, 95, n.83-85 (1995); B. Zorina Kahn, Married Women's Property Laws and
Female Commercial Activity: Evidence from United States Patent Records, 1790-1895, 56 J. ECON.
HIST. 356, 360-65, nn.15, 20, 26 (1996); Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L.
REV. 359, 374 (1989); Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and Personal Jurisdiction, 1995 U. ILL.
L. REv. 813, 826, n.58-59 (1995).
30. See infra Part II.
31. See infra Part III.A-C.
32. See infra Part IV.A-C.
33. See infra Part V.
34. See infra Parts III, IV, V.
35. See infra Part V.
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In Part V, my findings suggest that the characteristic of the judges'
party affiliation did have a positive correlation on how the judges of the
19th century voted on married women's property acts.
36
II. EARLY AMERICA AND SOCIAL REFORM
Kindred humanitarian reform movements materialized in the 1830s.
31
Why the 1830s? This decade sits firmly in the prime social history period
that has been coined the "Freedom's Ferment," running from American
colonial time to the Civil War.38 In the 1830s, the abolitionist movement
was changing from one focusing on the colonization of Black people to one
advocating for immediate emancipation.39 Other movements such as prison
reform; educating the dumb, deaf, and blind; world peace and women's
rights, were also rising during this new social period.40
Those who were directly involved in the reform movements did not
identify one 'specific influencing factor, but rather credited three in their
memoirs and autobiographies: religion, reading, and reflection.4 1 Gilbert H.
Barnes and Dwight L. Dumond pointed to Evangelist Charles Grandison
Finney's influence as tantamount in changing the focus of the abolitionist
movement to immediate emancipation and also sparking the early women's
42rights movement. Finney became both a professor and president of
Oberlin College, the first college in America to admit both Black people and
women.43 Finney's most influential convert was Theodore Dwight Weld.
44
Weld studied the Ministry at Lane's Seminary in Cincinnati, an
institution known for its anti-slavery stance. The Seminary's Board of
Directors then discontinued anti-slavery debates that Weld organized with
ministers and other intellectuals. 45  Weld then organized a walkout of
Lane's Seminary taking the majority of students with him to Northern Ohio,
36. See infra Part V.
37. DAVID DONALD, LINCOLN RECONSIDERED 21 (1959).
38. ALICE FELT TYLER, FREEDOM'S FERMENT: PHASES OF AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY FROM
THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE CIVIL WAR iiv-ix, 1-2 (Harper & Rowe, 1961)
(providing classic discussion of variety of social reform movements in early America).
39. DONALD, supra note 37, at 21.
40. Id.
41. Id
42. See generally GILBERT H. BARNES, THE ANTISLAVERY IMPULSE, 1830-1844 7-9 (Harcourt,
Brace & World, 1957); Letter from John Keep to Weld (Jan. 11, 1839), in LETTERS OF THEODORE
DWIGHT WELD, ANGELINA GRIMKE WELD AND SARAH GRIMKE 1822-1844 739-84 (Gilbert H. Barnes &
Dwight L. Dumond eds., 1934).
43. People & Ideas: Charles Finney, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/godinamerica/people/charles-
finney.html (last visited May 5, 2014).
44. Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 165, 176 n.28 (2011); DONALD, supra note 37, at 24.
45. Barnett, supra note 44, at 176.
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where he and his group of activists formed Oberlin College.46 Weld was a
charismatic abolitionist, who David Donald credited as "the greatest of the
Western abolitionists ... ,7 He married Angelina Grimke, one of the best
known abolitionists and women's rights advocates of the nineteenth
century. 48 "Weld agreed with his wife's desire for equality between men
and women and became an outspoken supporter of the women's rights
movement.
4 9
In his study of abolitionists in early America, David Donald identified
fourteen women.5 0 He characterized almost all of the 106 abolitionists he
studied as "strong Whigs."5' Several of these abolitionists were part of the
1830s social reform movement comprised mostly of younger men and
women." Coming primarily from old and dominant Northeastern families,
these well-educated, and serious young people were reaching maturity in the
1830s.53 At the same time, the bustling new industrial-driven business
world was starting to boom in the larger cities.
5 4
Many of the new leaders of industry displaced these maturing offspring
of the previous gentry.5 A few, like Daniel Webster, were able to transfer
their talents to the "god of trade," but most of them held "disdain for the
new money-grabbing class .... ,,6 The transfer of leadership to this new
industrial upstart class created an agitation amongst the offspring of the
well-to-do Federalist parents.5 7 The old, refined Northeast gentry offspring
gave way to industrialization born on the backs of a slave-owning
oligarchy.5 8  The 1830s proved to be ripe for young, bright and well-
educated displaced individuals who had the time and resources to take part
in serious social reform. 9 Ironically, the same industrial revolution that
these reformers blamed for many of the country's social ills also broke
down some of the old gender roles that were manifest under the common
law.60
46. Id.
47. DONALD, supra note 37, at 24.
48. Theodore D. Weld, OHIO HISTORY CENTRAL,
http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/w/TheodoreD._Weld (last visited May 5, 2014).
49. Id.
50. DONALD, supra note 37, at 28-29.
51. Id. at 26, 32.
52. Id at 21, 34-35.
53. Id at 33.
54. Id
55. DONALD, supra note 37, at 34-35.
56. Id at 33-34.
57. Id. at 27, 33-34.
58. Id. at 33-35.
59. Id. at 33-34.
60. DONALD, supra note 37, at 28, 30, 34.
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III. LEADING UP TO PASSAGE
A. Mississippi
In 1839, Mississippi became the first state to pass a married women's
property act. 61 Before this enactment, Mississippi was a common law state
that placed a married woman and her property under the absolute control of
her husband.62
The Louisiana Territory bordering Mississippi retained the civil law
system that was in force under the previously ruling French and Spanish
administrations.63 Under civil law, community property acquired during
marriage became part of the joint property of the husband and wife.64 Other
property not held jointly remained the separate estate of the owner.65 A
married woman in a civil law state could hold her separate estate free from
any title or proprietary right of her husband.66 Mississippi, as stated above,
was a common law state, but the proximity of civil law had an influence.67
Mississippi State Senator T.B.J. Hadley introduced two bills in 1839.68
The first was .' for the protection and preservation of the rights and property
of married women."' 69 The second was for Hadley's own protection against
creditors, "for the relief of T.B.J. Hadley . . . .," which exempted Hadley
from a State of Mississippi promissory note.7" The second bill passed
without difficulty.7 The first bill did not.72
Hadley married well-propertied
Piety Smith, daughter of Andrew Jackson's old friend, David Smith
and sister of Chickasaw agent Benjamin Fort Smith .... Piety's
sister was Obedience Smith, the wife of Governor Hiram Runnels.
David Smith had bequeathed his assets to the daughters in trust.
The trustee was brother Benjamin, already accused of the
misappropriation of Chickasaw tribal funds. No doubt Hadley
61. 1839 Miss. Laws 920.
62. Elizabeth Gasper Brown, Book Note, Memorandum on the Mississippi Woman's Law of
1839, 42 MICH. L. REV. 1110, 1110-11 (1944).
63. Id. at 1I11.
64. RICHARD A. BALLINGER, A TREATISE ON THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE,
UNDER THE COMMUNITY OR GANANCIAL SYSTEM 4 (1895).
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. LeAnne Howe, Betsy Love and the Mississippi Married Women's Property Act of 1839,
MISS. HISTORICAL SOC'Y (Sept. 2005), http://mshistorynow.mdah.state.ms.us/articles/6/betsy-love-and-
the-mississippi-married-womens-property-act-of-1
8 3 9 ; Brown, supra note 63, at 1110-11, 1117.
68. Brown, supra note 62, at 1113-14.
69. Id.
70. Id.; Howe, supra note 67; 1839 Miss. Laws 280-81.
71. Brown, supra note 62, at 1113-14.
72. Id. at 1114.
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hoped to shelter his wife's assets both from his own creditors and
from her own trustee.73
Many senators worried about the effect the first bill would have on the
creditors of married men. 74  "[Senator Grayson] stated, all the married
women would have all the property and it would thus be exempt from their
husbands' creditors. 75 The bill did not pass the Senate the first time it was
introduced, but it was reconsidered two days later.76 On February 11, 1839,
the Senate committee proposed an amendment to the bill providing:
[t]hat any married woman may become seized or possessed of any
property, real or personal, by direct bequest, demise, gift, purchase,
or distribution, in her own name, and as of her own property,
provided the same does not come from her husband after
coverture.77
Adding the words, "provided the same does not come from her husband
after coverture," solved the problem of a husband giving property to his
wife simply to avoid creditors.78 The bill, as amended, passed both the
Mississippi Senate and House of Representatives, and the governor signed it
into law on February 16, 1839.
79
Mississippi's married women's property law, the first law of its kind
that an American state adopted, allowed awoman to hold her own property
separately from her husband.8° Section two of the statute expressly stated
that the wife's separate property was "exempt from any liability for the
debts or contracts of the husband.",81 Section four, however, stipulated that
even if the wife owned slaves coming into the marriage or acquired them
afterward, their control and management, along with any concomitant
profits from their labor, should be reserved to the husband.82 Section five
further stipulated that slaves the wife separately owned could not be sold
except by joint deed of the husband and wife.83
73. Megan Benson, Fisher v. Allen: The Southern Origins of the Married Women's Property Act,
6 J. S. LEGAL HIST. 97, 113 (1998).
74. Brown, supra note 62, at 1114.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1115.
77. Id at 1116 (quoting J. OF THE SENATE OF MIss. 263 (1839)).
78. Id. at 1114-16.
79. Brown, supra note 62, at 1116.
80. Id.; but see Michael B. Dougan, The Arkansas Married Woman's Property Law, 46 ARK.
HIST. Q. 3, 3 (1987) (crediting Arkansas Territory as first adopter of married woman property act).





With little doubt, Senator Hadley was aware of an 1837 Mississippi
Supreme Court decision, Fisher v. Allen. 84 The decision held that in certain
circumstances a married woman had the right to dispose of her own
property." In addition, a wife's property was not subject to the demands of
her husband's creditors. 86  The wife in Fisher, was a member of the
Chickasaw Indian Tribe.87 She married a white man, James Allen.88 It was
Chickasaw custom that, upon marriage, the wife's property did not vest in
the husband.89 The property in question was a slave, Toney, whom
Elizabeth Allen had decided to deed to one of her daughters, Susan Allen.90
The Chickasaw signed two allotment treaties in the 1830s. 9' The first was
ratified in 1833 and the second in 1834.92 "Under the terms of the [second]
treaty, any Chickasaw woman married to a white man held land in her own
name with no right of alienation enjoyed by her husband. 93
Justices William L. Sharkey and Cotesworth P. Smith wrote the joint
opinions for Fisher.94 Sharkey and Smith realized that Chickasaw women
needed to have control over property for quick transactions. 95 Chickasaw
matrilineal custom dictated that the woman was the primary landholder
within the Chickasaw Nation and women needed to convey property
freely.96 The Mississippi justices determined Elizabeth Allen's identity as a
Chickasaw through treaty and Indian custom took legal precedence over
common law coverture. 97 Tribal law prevailed because tribes were not
subject to Mississippi law when the marriage was formed. 98 This case was
decided toward the end of President Jackson's second term, an especially
shameful time in America's long-term abhorrent treatment of Indians. 99
This was the same time the federal government was designating tribal land
84. Fisher v. Allen, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) 611, 614 (Miss. 1837).
85. Id. at 614, 616.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 612.
88. Id. at 612-13.
89. Fisher, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) at 612.
90. Benson, supra note 73, at 99.
91. Idat 103-104.
92. Idat 103-104.
93 Id. at 104.
94. Id. at 611,614.
95. See Benson, supra note 73, at 611,614.
96. Id. at 103-06.
97. Id. at 102, 104.
98. Fisher, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) at 613.
99. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 532 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1, 13-14 (1831); see generally Calvin Martin, Preface to THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE
PROBLEM OF HISTORY viii (Calvin Martin ed., 1987) ; see also generally RETHINKING AMERICAN
INDIAN HISTORY (Donald L. Fixico ed., 1997); see also generally ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, JR., THE
WHITE MAN'S INDIAN: IMAGES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN FROM COLUMBUS TO THE PRESENT (Vintage
Books, 1978).
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allotments to land speculators. 00 Were there any personal characteristics or
attributes identified in Sharkey or Smith's available biographical data that
would suggest such a "remarkable decision" even by contemporary
standards in 1837? l""
For one thing, Sharkey and Smith were both Whigs. For purposes of
analyzing both judges, Sharkey will be discussed now and Smith when
discussing another case decided after the passage of the Married Woman's
Property Act of 1839.102 Sharkey was a Whig and a loyal Unionist. 10 3 He
refused to participate in either state or confederate government during the
Civil War. President Johnson appointed him as provisional Governor of
Mississippi after the War.10 4  Did the fact that the property was a Black
slave have any effect on Sharkey's decision? Sharkey was most likely, like
many members of the pre-war Southern judiciary, sensitive to the "siege
mentality," a white hysteria based on a defensive or overly fearful attitude
that gradually took hold over the pre-Civil War South.10 5
Sharkey in a different case, ruled against the importation of slaves to
Mississippi and for the exportation of free Blacks. 10 6 Sharkey's opinion did
not spring from a racist point of view, in fact it is similar to that of the early
abolitionists. Rather it is from a realistic, practical approach meant to
protect against civil unrest in antebellum Mississippi.'0 7 The 1838 decision
was Hinds v. Brazealle.10 8 In Brazealle, a man took both a Black slave
woman and her son to Ohio to be emancipated, and then returned to
Mississippi. 109
Elisha Brazealle, the man who made the trip to Ohio possible for the
woman and her son, devised his property to John Munroe Brazealle, the
former slave, acknowledging him as his son.110  Elisha's heirs challenged
100. Benson, supra note 73, at 102-03.
101. Id. at 106.
102. See infra notes 272-294 and accompanying text.
103. Michael P. Mills, Slave Law in Mississippi from 1817-1861: Constitutions, Codes and Cases,
71 Miss. L.J. 153, 180 (2001).
104. Id. at 104.
105. Mills, supra note 103, at 175; William James Hull Hoffer, North v. South: A Legal History of
the Caning of Charles Sumner, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 515, 524 (2013) (explaining that judges and legislators
in South Carolina also suffered from siege mentality); see Siege Mentality, MERRIAM WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/siege%20mentality (last visited May 6, 2014); LACY K.
FORD, DELIVER US FROM EVIL: THE SLAVERY QUESTION IN THE OLD SOUTH 294-96 (2009) (explaining
the reaction to abolitionism in several southern states).
106. Benson, supra note 73, at 103.
107. Mills, supra note 103, at 180-83; see also Franklin L. Riley, A Contribution to the History of
the Colonization Movement in Mississippi, in 9 PUBL'NS OF THE MISS. HISTORICAL SOC'Y 345-48
(1906).
108. Hinds v. Brazealle, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) 837, 841-44 (Miss. 1838).
109. Id. at 841.
110. Id.
[Vol. 40
MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACTS
the will, contending that John was still a slave."' Sharkey did recognize
comity but reasoned that slavery was such a part of the essence, structure,
and culture of Mississippi that freedom would have to lose to bondage in
this case.'12
The policy of a state is indicated by the general course of legislation
on a given subject, and we find that free negroes are deemed
offensive, because they are not permitted to emigrate to, or remain
in the state. They are allowed few privileges, and subject to heavy
penalties for offences. They are required to leave the state within
thirty days after notice, and in the meantime give security for good
behavior, and those of them who can lawfully remain, must register
and carry with them their certificates, or they may be committed to
jail. It would also violate a positive law, passed by the legislature,
expressly to maintain this settled policy, and to prevent
emancipation. No owner can emancipate his slave, but by a deed or
will properly attested, or acknowledged in court, and proof to the
legislature, that such slave has performed some meritorious act for
the benefit of the master, or some distinguished service for the state;
and the deed or will can have no validity until ratified by special act
of the legislature. It is believed that this law and policy are too




In the early nineteenth century, New York was a common law state with
a court system closely modeled after England's. 14 Like England, but unlike
most American states, New York separated its common law and equity
courts. 15 Although the common law granted husbands complete control
and management over property coming to the marriage through either side,
the chancery courts in New York made it possible in some instances for
married women to hold a separate estate.16
The most successful mode of circumventing the common law in New
York was the marriage settlement. 17 If there were special circumstances,
111. Id. at 841-42.
112. Id. at 842-43.
113. Brazealle, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) at 842-43.
114. G. Edward White, The Chancellor's Ghost, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 229, 233-34 (1998).
115. Id.
116. BASCH, supra note 4, at 73.
117. See generally M'Cartee v. Teller, 2 Paige Ch. 511,526 (N.Y. Ch. 1831); see also generally
McWhorter v. Agnew, 6 Paige Ch. 111, 115-16 (N.Y. Ch. 1836); see also generally Temple v. Hawley,
I Sand. Ch. 153, 154-55 (1844).
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such as a large inheritance expected during marriage or a substantial dowry,
the couple could enter into a marriage settlement designating what each
person's property would consist of after the wedding vows, providing for
any contingencies. 118 "[A marriage] settlement [could be used to keep]
property out of the husband's reach . . . [and] out of the reach of [his]
creditors .... .""9 It gave the wife powers over her property that she did not
have at common law. 120 "Powers reserved to the wife ran anywhere from
full autonomy over her property to complete dependence on a . . .
trustee."
121
The marriage settlement was an antenuptial contract, however, and the
husband-to-be had to approve it.
122
If the main objective was to insulate the wife's property from the
husband, the active trust-the conveyance of the wife's property to
a trustee who actively managed it for her benefit-was the most
secure arrangement ... [A]n antenuptial contract drawn up ... with
a trust presented New York families of wealth and standing with an
attractive alternative to the common law arrangement of marital
property. 123
Such a trust that a father arranged for his daughter, for example, could
insulate the daughter's property from the husband-to-be. 124 In Methodist
Episcopal Church v. Jaques,125 the New York Chancery Court recognized
the passive trust.126 These trusts created, through nominal trustees, a device
that allowed "married women beneficiaries to manage the trust assets
actively... ," reserving powers to the married woman. 127
Mary Alexander, a widow possessed of an estate valued at $22,000,
created a trust for her own use and that of her husband in an
antenuptial agreement. Her trust deed conveyed all her estate real
and personal to one H. Cruger until her marriage should take place,
and after that for such purposes as she and her husband should
designate by deed with two witnesses. After her marriage she
118. BASCH, supra note 4, at 74.
119. Id. at 74-75.
120. Id. at 75.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. BASCH, supra note 4, at 75.
124. Id.
125. Methodist Episcopal Church v. Jaques, I Johns. Ch. 450 (N.Y. Ch. 1815).
126. BASCH, supra note 4, at 76.
127. Yvette Joy Liebesman, No Guarantees: Lessons from the Property Rights Gained and Lost by
Married Women in Two American Colonies, 27 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 181, 198 (2006) (citing
Methodist Episcopal, I Johns. Ch. at 507).
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conveyed her property in trust to Robert Jaques, a relative of her
husband, stipulating that at her death one-third of the surplus after
expenses was to go to the Methodist Episcopal Church, one-third to
relatives, and one-third to her husband. The trustees of the church
demanded an accounting, claiming that the husband . . . had used
the income from the realty for personal expenses and had
appropriated her personal property.
[The chancery court ruled] . . . that the first trust she created was
fictional in a .legal sense. The trust deed, although signed by Cruger
and properly witnessed, never left her possession and Cruger never
actively managed her property. Her second trust was created after
her marriage on the basis of the powers reserved to her in the
original trust and antenuptial contract. Chancellor Kent affirmed the
validity of the arrangement ... ruling that no allowances were to be
made for the support of the couple out of the rents of the trust
because support was the husband's common law duty and neither
[of the trusts] . . . stipulated otherwise. More important, he
established the principle that the wife enjoyed powers over her
separate estate only to the extent that they were spelled out in the
deed that created the estate.
128
In Bradish v. Gibbs, 29 the issue was whether a married woman was
able to devise her real property.
130
In 1814, Helen Gibbs entered into a marriage contract with her
fianc6 stipulating that any profits and sales from her estate made
during her marriage were for her own separate use. She was to
have full power during her coverture to dispose of her property ...
by will or by any instrument in writing. Her transactions were to be
'considered as valid as if she were a feme sole. A separate schedule
listed her property, including a house in New York City purchased
at the time of her marriage for $23,500. [The contract said that] [i]f
her husband died before her . . . her property was to vest in her
absolutely, as if no marriage had taken place.
[In 1816,] Helen Gibbs Brandish's husband was forced to sue his
wife's relatives .... [He contended that his wife, Helen, as part of
her will, had conveyed the house title to him.] .... The attorney for
128. BASCH, supra note 4, at 76-77.
129. Bradish v. Gibbs, 3 Johns. Ch. 523 (N.Y. Ch. 1818).
130. Id.
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her relatives argued that her will, [having been executed during
coverture in favor of the husband, was void at law and in equity.]..
. . Kent found the will valid and the reservation of testamentary
power to the wife quite safe from the husband's coercion because a
will was 'revocable at the pleasure of the wife." 3"
"Chancellor Kent held that the creation of a trust, even a trust that
functioned as a legal fiction, was not necessary .... [He upheld] the validity
of her antenuptial contract without a trust. ,132 These early decisions in
New York Chancery Courts made it possible and simple for a married
woman to create a separate estate as long as her husband-to-be agreed to
release his common law marital rights over her property.' 33 Since these
early cases in New York were decided in equity courts, the ideology of the
judges, while presumably interesting, was not researched. Because of the
nature of the court and the fact that more options were available to the
chancery judges than the law judges, it would be difficult to examine
judicial ideology in the same context.
34
The battle for a comprehensive married woman's property act in New
York earnestly began in the 1830s when New York City Assemblyman
Thomas Hertell introduced a resolution for the appointment of a committee
to report on married women's property rights in New York.135 Several of
the social reform orators arguing for women's rights in the 1830s influenced
Hertell, and in 1837, he introduced a bill that Godey's Lady Book, a journal
with wide circulation around the country, endorsed. 136 "Hertell argued that
the common law deprived wives of their inalienable, natural right to
property.1 37 Advocating for a rightful solution, "'[h]e pointed to French
and Louisiana law and Quaker custom.""' 138  He stated that "'[m]arried
women,.., equally with males and unmarried females, possess the right to
life, liberty, and PROPERTY and are equally entitled to be protected in all
three.' ' 139 Hertell would eventually become the sponsor of the first married
women's property act passed in New York in 1848.140
131. Id.
132." Id.
133. Id. at 78-79.
134. But see White, supra note 114, at 233-34 (providing a biography of Kent).
135. BASCH, supranote4, at 113, 115.
136. Rick Geddes et al., Human Capital Accumulation and the Expansion of Women's Economic
Rights, 55 J.L. & ECON. 839, 843 (2012) (quoting PEGGY A. RABKIN, FATHERS TO DAUGHTERS: THE
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF FEMALE EMANCIPATION 87 (1980)); BASCH, supra note 4, at 120.
137. BASCH, supra note 4, at 118.
138. Mary Moers Wenig, The Marital Property Law of Connecticut: Past, Present and Future,
1990 WiS. L. REV. 807, 817 n.40 (1990) (quoting E. WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS OF
MARRIED WOMEN, 1800-1861 107 (unpublished thesis, Harvard Univ. Archives, 1960)).
139. BASCH, supra note 4, at 118-19.
140. Geddes, supra note 136, at 843.
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The New York legislature in 1840 turned its attention to widowhood. 14 1
The widow was viewed as an object of pity, an unsupported woman, and a
potential drain on the economy.1 42  To empower the widow, the 1840
legislature passed a married women's insurance act that enabled a wife to
own life insurance on her husband and to receive its benefits free from the
claims of his creditors. 43  "[T]his statute marked the emergence of life
insurance as an important business . . . ."'44 In 1845, the New York
legislature passed a statute that allowed "a wife to own her own patent ...
[T]his was the only law of its kind in the [country] .... ,145
The acts of 1840 and 1845 were certainly victories for married women
in New York. 146 Some of this positive movement was almost inevitable.
147
The new economic structures fostered by burgeoning industrialization and
business required a certain amount of legal change. 48  The insurance
business could not have grown and flourished under the old common law
terms of marriage. 149 There was still a real recalcitrance in giving married
women more rights during this time.15  The belief was that these rights or
powers could "erode the separation of the public arena of work and politics
from the private sphere of domesticity and reproduction .... [The gradual
erosion of] the sexual division of labor was a critical ingredient of industrial
capitalism."'1
51
Although most legislators were resolutely committed to serving the
legal needs of an expanding market economy, they were disturbed
by its social consequences. They were concerned about eroding the
sexual division of labor. If the wife were liberated from her
common law restrictions, she might very well enter the commercial
arena as a wage owner or, even worse, an entrepreneur, becoming
in a sense her husband's competitor. 152
141. BASCH, supra note 4, at 137; 1840 N.Y. Laws 59.
142. See Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction
of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1662-68 (2003).
143. BASCH, supra note 4, at 137; 1840 N.Y. Laws 59.
144. BASCH, supra note 4, at 137.
145. Id; 1845 N.Y. Laws 11.
146. See BASCH, supra note 4, at 137.
147. See id
148. Seeid at 121.
149. See id. at 137.
150. See generally Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 33-34
(2012); Dubler, supra note.142, at 1655.
151. BASCH, supra note 4, at 144.
152. Id at 141.
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The most popular argument advanced in favor of a married women's
property act was based on the established equity precedents. 153 The New
York Judiciary Committee to the Assembly insisted that it was satisfied
with the general principles established in equity relating to a married
woman's separate estate, but suggested that there was considerable
confusion in the legal profession about the principles. 154 The committee
also drew attention to the fact that the common law ruled and prevailed over
most couples' marriages. 5 5  The committee reported that if the equity
principles were put into statute form, the problems for the legal profession
and the common people would be solved.
156
The delegates to the 1846 New York Constitutional Convention "voted
to insert a married women's clause into the state constitution .... [but after
three days of debate] they rescinded it.",157  The debates of the
Constitutional Convention demonstrated the growing desire for reform in
the property rights of married women, and, in 1848, a bill was introduced,
passed, and signed into law.
158
Section one of the 1848 statute stated that the real and personal property
of any woman who was married after the bill became law would continue to
own the property as if she were single. 159 The property was not subject to
her husband's debts.' 60  Section two retroactively applied the same
provisions to women who were married before the act.161 Section three
allowed a married woman to receive, by gift, grant, or devise, real and
personal property free from her husband's disposal and his creditors.'
62
Section four recognized the ongoing validity of antenuptial agreements.
63
This was the first statute in New York that specifically allowed married
women the right to possess their own separate property.
64
153. Id. at 148.
154. REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IN RELATION TO DIVORCE AND THE SEPARATE
PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN, No. 219, 69th Sess., at 1-3 (N.Y. 1846).
155. See id. at 2-3.
156. Id. at 1-3.
157. BASCH, supra note 4, at 150.
158. Id. at 136, 156. Hertell sponsored the act and associated with the Seneca Falls Convention,
where a group of feminists convened in Seneca Falls, New York, signaling the birth of the women's
movement that took place shortly after the passage of the 1848 act. See supra notes 19-22 and
accompanying text.
159. 1848 N.Y. Laws 307.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 308.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Joseph A. Ranney, Anglicans, Merchants, and Feminists: A Comparative Study of the
Evolution of Married Women's Rights in Virginia, New York, and Wisconsin, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 493, 506 (2000).
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C. Oregon
In the early nineteenth century, Oregon was part of an unsettled
frontier. 165 Both the United States and Great Britain asserted claims to the
area. 166 The organic laws of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which were
very similar to the common law of England, 167 were the basis of the laws
before 1843. In 1843, a provisional government termed Oregon Country
was established. 168  Oregon Country adopted the organic laws already in
place and the Laws of Iowa leaving anything unsettled to the Laws of
England. 169 Iowa law stated that women could not enter into contracts, own
personal property, or face suit.'
70
The act establishing the Oregon Territory was passed on August 14,
1848.171 The Donation Land Claim Act, which went into effect in 1850,
was intended to promote homestead settlements in the Pacific Northwest. 172
It was the only federal land grant act permitting married women to obtain
title to federal lands in their own right. 173 The Donation Land Claim Act
provided that people settling in Oregon by December 1, 1850 could claim:
the quantity of one half section, or three hundred and twenty acres
of land, if a single man, and if a married man, or if he shall become
married within one year from the first day of December, eighteen
hundred and fifty, the quantity of one section, or six hundred and
forty acres, one half to himself and the other half to his wife, to be
held by her in her own right .... 74
Soon thereafter, the United States House of Representatives adopted an
amendment to the Donation Land Claim Act. 175  New York Whig
Congressman William Sackett moved to have the following words inserted:
165. See William F. Cloran, The Ownership of Water in Oregon: Public Property vs. Private
Commodity, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 627, 642 (2011).
166. Id.
167. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North-West of the
River Ohio, (July 13, 1787), reprinted in I LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FROM THE 4TH OF
MARCH, 1789, TO THE 4TH OF MARCH 1815 (1989); Cloran, supra note 165, at 642.
168. Cloran, supra note 165, at 642.
169. Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law, 62 VAND. L.
REV. 1353, 1391 (2009); Cloran, supra note 165, at 642.
170. Abrams, supra note 169, at 1391.
171. An Act to Establish the Territorial Government of Oregon, ch. 177, 9 Stat. 323 (1848). -
172. An Act to Create the Office of Surveyor-General of the Public Lands in Oregon, and to
Provide for the Survey, and to Make Donations to Settlers of the Said Public Lands, ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496
(1850) (hereinafter Surveyor General); see Robert J. Miller, American Indians, the Doctrine of
Discovery, and Manifest Destiny, 11 WYO. L. REV. 329, 347-48 (2011).
173. Scott, supra note 24, at 433.
174. Surveyor General, supra note 172, at 497.
175. CONG. GLOBE, 31ST CONG., 1ST SESS. 1094 (1850).
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"'And no interest in the part so held by the wife in her own right, shall be
liable for, or subject to sale upon the debts of her husband.'
176
In 1852, the Oregon territorial legislature adopted an act that exempted
married women's donation claims from their husbands' debts.177 The act
stated that a wife's donation claim was "'secured to the sole and separate
use and control of the wife' and that all legal and equitable interests in such
claims 'shall in no [way] be made subject to or liable for the debts or
liabilities of her husband, whether contracted before or after the passage of
this act."",178 With the exception of donation land, no other real estate was
covered and the common law rule that men gain title to their wives'
personal property upon marriage was not affected. 7 9
The property benefits for women in the Oregon Territory through the
rest of the 1850s until 1857 were a mixed bag.' 80 Women gained a victory
in 1853 by being given the right to make wills to dispose of their real
property. 18  The territorial legislature, however, adopted an act the next
year that repealed all but a few statutes that had been passed before 1854.182
The act had the effect of repealing the Exemption Act of 1852.183 Once
again a wife's claim could be subject to her husband's debts.
184
Although the Donation Land Claim Act was not repealed, the property
was still subject to the management and control of husbands under the
act. 185 Married women received title to half a section, or 320 acres, but the
practical impact on the common law was not always that significant. 186 For
example, if husbands died before the requisite four-year occupational
requirement, the Donation Land Claim Act would deprive a widowed
woman of her claim. 1
87
Delegates from the Oregon Territory met in August 1857 for a
constitutional convention. 88  On September 16, 1857, a debate on the
provision of a married women's property section took place. 89 Delegates
from both sides of the issue wrangled for or against a woman's right to own
176. Id.; BENJAMIN PERLEY POORE, THE POLITICAL REGISTER AND CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY
608 (1878).
177. Chused, supra note 7, at 9 & n.15.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See id at 9-13.
181. Id. at 10; 1853 Or. Laws 788 (1853).
182. Chused, supra note 7, at 10.
183. Id.
184. See id at 10-11.
185. Id. at 10.
186. Surveyor General, supra note 172, at 497; see Chused, supra note 7, at 10-16.
187. Surveyor General, supra note 172, at 497; Chused, supra note 7, at 10-11.




her own property. 190 Delegate George Williams' 9' supported the motion to
strike the Donation Land Claim Act out of the constitution, stating that "[i]n
this age of woman's rights and insane theories, our legislation should be
such as to unite the family circle, and make husband and wife what they
should be-bone of one bone, and flesh of one flesh."' 92 Williams went on
to contend that the "Donation Law" had been the cause of many divorces. 1
9 3
Delegate David Logan countered that the law "furnished the wife
protection for her property against the improvidence or spendthrift habits of
her husband."' 194  He continued that if the husband was not prudent and
thrifty the law would "have the power to preserve her property to support
herself and educate her children."' 195 Logan also offered that "[h]e had
never heard of any divorces growing out of [the Donation Law]."' 9 6
Delegate John Kelsay said that he had heard of such divorces and if the
Act is not striken the law "would make the husband simply a boarder at his
wife's establishment."' 197 In response, Delegate Frederick Waymire stated
he was against striking out the law. 198 Both his mother and his wife were
women and if they should "legislate for any class it should be the women of
this country[] [because] [t]hey worked harder than anybody else in it."' 99
He went on to say that "[i]f men married for money they ought not to have
control of it. Every day they lived together they lived in adultery, for he
married the money and not the girl. 2 °0
Delegate Paine Page Prim shot back that if the day of payment came
only to find that the property belonged to the wife, "the honest creditor"
would be the one who was cheated. 20 1 The debate ended with Delegate
Delazon Smith asserting that "[i]t was not separate and distinct property
which caused divorces[, but rather] the want of affection-the want of
marriage of the heart., 20 2  Smith went on to state that "[h]e was for
190. Id. at 16-17.
191. George Williams was a democrat who, in 1865, joined the Republican Party and was
appointed to the United States Senate later in the same year. In 1873, he became the United States
Attorney General under President Grant. He authored the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Biographical Sketch of George Williams, OREGON STATE ARCHIVES,
http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/pages/exhibits/1857/during/bios/williams.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
192. THE OREGON CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL




196. Id at 368-69.





202. Carey, supra note 192, at 369.
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woman's rights, and was not afraid of her having too many. She had been
too long denied her just rights .... [And he] would protect her property
from dissipated or mercenary wretches.,
203
The provision remained in the draft with a vote of twenty-two yeas to
strike out the law opposed to twenty-seven nays.204 Delegate Williams, the
most outspoken delegate in favor of striking the law, wasted no time in
moving to amend the provision "so that only the wife's property obtained
by gift, devise and inheritance should be exempt from the debts and
contracts of the husband. The [remaining property] he thought was too
indefinite and uncertain.'205 Thirty-one yeas led to the adoption of
William's motion.2 The draft provision became part of the Constitution
when Oregon became a state in 1859.207 The provision did away with
coverture, stating:
The property and pecuniary rights of every married woman, at the
time of marriage, or afterward acquired by gift, devise, or
inheritance, shall not be subject to the debts or contracts of the
husband; and laws shall be passed providing for the registration of
the wife's separate property.
208
IV. RESPONSES TO PASSAGE
How did the state Supreme Court judges from Mississippi, New York,
and Oregon rule on nineteenth century married women's property acts?
There has been considerable discussion in scholarly legal research over the





207. Miller, supra note 172, at 348.
208. OR. CONST. of 1857, art. XV, § 5.
209. See generally Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A
Meta-Analysis, 20 JUSTICE SYS. J. 219, 220 (1999); Donald R. Songer & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Not the
Whole Story: The Impact of Justices' Values on Supreme Court Decision Making, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI.
1049, 1049 (1996); Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83
N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1275 (2005); Richard A. Posner, Foreword" A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV.
31, 33 (2005); Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates
About Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 744-46 (2005); Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Asking
the Right Questions About Judicial Decision Making?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531, 1540 (2009); Frank B. Cross,
Decision-making in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1459-60 (2003); Gregory
C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning,
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1377 (1998); Michael A. Perino, Strategic Decision Making in Federal District
Courts: Evidence from Securities Fraud Actions 1-2 (St. John's Univ. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, No. 05-013, 2005), available at http:// ssm.com/abstract=727905 (analyzing two
hundred and sixty-eight opinions from federal district courts considering motions to dismiss after 1996).
But cf Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335,
1335 (1998) (arguing that judicial decision-making in the D.C. Circuit is facilitated by congeniality
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There are several models and methods that have been discussed and
examined. 10 Many studies have concentrated on the attitudinal and
strategic models.211  This paper lent itself most easily to the personal
attributes model.212
The strategic model is an attractive model, but not enough information
is available on the various judges in this nineteenth century study to make it
feasible.213 One of the tenets of the strategic model is the realization that
judges do not make decisions in a vacuum based solely on their own
ideological beliefs and values.2 14  They act strategically, taking into
consideration the preferences of other actors, in particular other judges, and
institutional settings.215 While there was voting information available on
the judges writing the main court opinions and some of the concurrences,
the lack of information available regarding all the other various court judges
made the use of the strategic model in this study impractical.
The attitudinal model is constructed on a belief that judges place more
emphasis in their determination of cases on political and policy
considerations compared to legal considerations.216 The attitudinal model
places judges on an ideological spectrum to determinine how liberal each
judge is. 217  Invariably political scientists use ideological proxies, usually
the party membership of the appointing executive or the judge him or
herself at the time of nomination.218 An appointee of a Whig governor, for
among judges and not principally by ideology); Joseph A. Custer, Ideological Voting Applied to the
School Desegregation Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals from the 1960's and 1970's (St. Louis
Univ. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2012-25, 2012) available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2142172.
210. See generally Posner, supra note 209; Cross, supra note 209.
211. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts ofAppeals: A Preliminary
Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 302-04 (2004); Corey Raybum Yung, Beyond Ideology: An Empirical
Study of Partisanship and Independence in the Federal Courts, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 505, 507-08
(2012); Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory ofDecisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals,
58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1640-42 (1998).
212. Custer, supra note 209, at 45 (suggesting "the attitudinal and personal attributes models" are
best for "historical empirical research").
213. Id
214. John Christopher Anderson, The Mysterious Lockstep Doctrine and the Future of Judicial
Federalism in Illinois, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 965, 980 (2013).
215. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1717, 1751-59 (1997); Anderson, supra note 214, at 980.
216. Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision
Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 315-16 (2002); Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When We
Talk About Ideology. Judicial Politics Scholarship and Naive Legal Realism, 83 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 231,
244-45 (2009); McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory ofJudicial Doctrine and the Rule
ofLaw, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1636 (1995).
217. Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State Courts and Constitutional Socio-Economic
Rights: Exploring the Underutilization Thesis, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 923, 965 (2011).
218. Custer, supra note 209, at 17-19; Sunstein et al., supra note 211, at 303; Robert Steinbuch,
An Empirical Analysis ofthe Influence of Reversal Rates in the Eighth Circuitfor 2008, 43 LoY. L.A. L.
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example, would be more likely to be in favor of women's property rights in
the nineteenth century than an appointee of a Democratic govemor.21 9 The
same applies to the political party of the judge himself or herself.220 Every
thing being equal, a Whig would rule more liberally than his Democratic
counterpart.221
Ideologically contested cases are the best to analyze with the attitudinal
model.222 Some of these current day subjects could include federalism, the
rights of criminal defendants, racial discrimination, gender discrimination,
women's rights, property rights, and capital punishment.223 The judicial
interpretation of married women's property acts passed in the nineteenth
century would clearly fall under the auspices of ideologically contested
cases.
The use of the attitudinal model in this study is limited, however, due to
the fact that the state Supreme Court judges in Mississippi and New York
during the period studied were elected rather than appointed.224 Therefore,
the proxy of the party membership of the appointing executive will not
prove useful for those two states. Oregon, in comparison, went back and
forth between electing and appointing their Supreme Court judges during
the period studied. Only one of the three Oregon judges analyzed in the
study, Ruben Boise, was appointed.225
Another proxy that political scientists use for determining a judge's
ideology is to look at the judge's own party membership.226 For this paper,
party identification was available for the ten judges who wrote the majority
decisions in the paper.227 This number is so small that the results will, out
REV. 51, 51-52 (2009); Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What is Judicial Ideology, and How
Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 133, 166-67 (2009).
219. See infra notes 279-284 and accompanying text; see Elizabeth R Varon, Tippecanoe and the
Ladies, Too: White Woman and Party Politics in Antebellum Virginia, 82 J. AM. HIST. 494, 496-502
(1995).
220. See Fischman, supra note 218, at 166-67.
221. See Varon, supra note 219, at 496-502.
222. See Sunstein et al., supra note 211, at 304-07.
223. Id at 304.
224. Selection of Judges, USLEGAL, http://courts.uslegal.com/selection-of-judges/ (last visited Jan.
30, 2014); Barbara F. Berenson, The People's Court: Pursuing Judicial Independence in America by Jed
Handelsman Shugerman (Harvard University Press, 2012), 400 Pages, 94 MASS. L. REV. 147, 148
(2013) (book review).
225. See infra note 420 and accompanying text; Reuben P. Boise Biography, STATE OF OREGON
LAW LIBRARY, http://www.oregon.gov/SOLL/Pages/ojd-historyjustice-biographies/r.p-boise-bio.aspx
(last visited Jan. 30, 2014); Erasmus D. Shattuck Biography, STATE OF OREGON LAW LIBRARY,
http://www.oregon.gov/SOLL/Pages/ojd-historyjustice-biographies/e-d-shattuck-bio.aspx (last visited
Jan. 30, 2014); Benjamin F. Bonham Biography, STATE OF OREGON LAW LIBRARY,
http://www.oregon.gov/SOLL/Pages/ojd-historyjustice-biographies/b-f-bonham-bio.aspx (last visited
Jan. 30, 2014).
226. Fischman, supra note 218, at 166-70.
227. See infra Table 1.
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of necessity, be anecdotal, but there still may be some insights that support,
at least anecdotally, some professed ideological assessments.
Some scholars view the attitudinal model to be most valuable as a
predictor of what judges will do in the future, rather than as a model used to
test and evaluate why judges behaved or ruled the way they did.22' The
model is used in this study with the proxy being the political party
membership of the judge.229
The personal attributes model looks at attributes that exist independent
of the judge's decision. No circularity is involved.230  The personal
attributes model is sometimes referred to as the social background theory.231
"Regardless of the label, these studies hypothesize that judicial
characteristics influence judicial decisions., 232 The attributes are those that
a judge brings to his or her position.233 Some of the attributes, or more
likely the experiences associated with them, can later appear to play a role
in a judge's policy preferences. 234  Scholars who study this model look
toward traits like political party, prior employment, religion, region, and
education.235 These attributes can be measured reliably.236 Either the judge
has the attribute or not. In one recent study, the three attributes studied were
where the judge went to law school (whether it was an Ivy League Law
School or not), the judge's religion, and the judge's previous work
experience (including whether the judge had been a prosecutor).237
In this paper, there were not that many judges that could be studied due
to the dearth of information available on many of them. 238  There was
significantly more biographical information available for researching the
ideologies of federal judges from the 1960s and the early 1970S.239 While it
was not possible to uncover information on all the various judges sitting on
228. Fischman, supra note 218, at 166-70; Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second
Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 569, 592 (2003); Custer, supra note 209,
at 6.
229. See infra Part V.
230. Tracey E. George, From Judge to Justice: Social Background Theory and the Supreme Court,




234. C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economic Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. POL. SC. REV. 355,
363-366 (1981).
235. Id. at 363.
236. See id
237. Custer, supra note 209, at 19-33.
238. Author was not successful in finding information on many of the judges who were not
writing the majority opinions.
239. Biographical Directory of Judges, 1789-Present, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/BiographicalDirectoryOfludges.aspx (last visited Aug. 13,
2013).
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the three states' high courts in the 1800s, fortunately there was information
available on the judges writing the majority opinions. 240 The one personal
attribute that could be ascertained on all ten of the nineteenth century state
judges writing the majority opinions was the judges' political party
membership. 241  This also happens to be the attribute that allows some
additional discussion of the attitudinal model.242
Information was also available on each of the ten judges' prior work
experience, including whether or not the judges had been prosecutors.243
All the judges had read the law as opposed to graduating from a law
school. 244  The regions in which the ten judges grew up were also
available.245  Some of the judges' religious affiliations were available.246
All of these traits or attributes will be reviewed more as we discuss the
associated cases that these judges decided.247 In the Judicial Ideology
section, Section V, below, there will be a summary of the attributes, in
addition to what each attribute is professed to suggest in regard to a judge's
ideology.24s Table One helps to illustrate and compare the findings. 249
A. Mississippi
In Ratcliffe v. Dougherty,250 the Mississippi Supreme Court interpreted
the Act of 1839.251 The issue was whether a deed of a gift made by a
husband directly to his wife after the passage of the Act of 1839 was
240. See infra Part V.
241. See infra Part V.
242. See supra notes 229-241 and accompanying text.
243. See infra Part V.
244. MIssIssIppI DEPARTMENT OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY, MISSISSIPPI 1022 (Dunbar Rowland
ed., 1907); Reuben P. Boise Biography, supra note 225; Veronica Benigno, Robert Earl, NY COURTS,
http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-new-york/luminaries-court-appeals/earl-robert.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2014); Brian Quinn, Charles Andrews, NY COURTS,
http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-new-york/luminaries-court-appeals/andrews-charles.html
(last visited Jan. 30, 2014); Frances Murray, Samuel Lee Selden, NY COURTS,
http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-new-york/luminaries-court-appeals/selden-samuel.html
(last visited Jan. 30, 2014); DUNBAR ROWLAND, COURTS, JUDGES, AND LAWYERS OF MISSISSIPPI 1798-
1935 87 (1935); Benjamin F. Bonham Biography, supra note 225; Thomas M. Keman, George Franklin
Comstock, NEW YORK STATE COURTS, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/legal-history-new-
york/luminaries-court-appeals/comstock-george.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2013); Erasmus D. Shattuck
Biography, supra note 225; James Daniel Lynch, The Bench and Bar of Mississippi, MISS. GENEALOGY
TRAILS, http://genealogytrails.com/miss/benchandbar2.html#COTESWORTH (last visited May 2,
2014).
245. See infra Part V.
246. See infra Part V.
247. See infra Part IV.A-C.
248. See infra Part V.
249. See infra Table 1.
250. Ratcliffe v. Dougherty, 24 Miss. 181 (Miss. 1852).
251. 1839 Miss. Laws 920.
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valid.252 The court ruled that by common law rule, "a gift by the husband
directly to the wife, without the intervention of a third party, whether by
deed or parol, was void, and could not be enforced., 253 The court did,
however, recognize the Act of 1839; it just did not find that it fit the facts of
the case.254 "It was passed by the legislature for the purpose and with the
intent of giving to married women certain rights, which, by the strict rules
of the common law, they did not possess.g
255
The court held that the deed of gift could not be enforced at law, but as
long as the nature and circumstances of the gift were such that there was no
reason to suspect fraud, it was valid and could be enforced in equity. 6 The
holding in Ratcliffe follows logically from the language of the statute.257
The women's law stated that a married woman could keep a gift of property
as her own separate property "[p]rovided, the same does not come from her
husband after coverture. 258 Justice William Yerger, who wrote the opinion
for Ratcliffe, like William Sharkey discussed above, 259 was a well-respected
judge known for his adherence to statutory law. 260  Also, like Sharkey,
Judge Yerger was an old-line Whig with decided Union leanings.261
Pre-Civil War supporters of women rights in America, from the late
1830s to the early 1850s, tended to be Whigs.262 Beginning with the 1840
presidential campaign, the Whig Party was the first to "systematically
include women in its public [rhetoric and] rituals. 2 63  When Whig
luminary, Daniel Webster, spoke at the Whig National Party Convention in
October 1840, he talked about the "'vast influence' of women on the well-
being of [American] society.' 264 Webster and James Barbour, apopular
Whig spokesmen and former Governor from Virginia, and well-known
lawyer, James Lyons, articulated a new theory on women's civic role at the
convention dubbed "Whig womanhood., 265  Whig womanhood in "its
equation of female patriotism with partisanship and its assumption that
252. Ratcliffe, 24 Miss. at 182.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 184-85.
255. Id. at 184.
256. Id. at 185.
257. 1839 Miss. Laws 920.
258. Id. (emphasis in original).
259. See supra notes 94-95, 101-112 and accompanying text.
260. See The Southern States of America, Chap. IV, Mississippi a Part of the Nation, 1865-1909,
ELEC. SCOTLAND, http://www.electricscotland.com/history/america/south/south38.htm (last visited Aug.
8, 2013); Ratcliffe, 24 Miss. at 184-85.
261. Southern States, supra note 260.
262. CONCISE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 600-602 (Michael
Kazin et al. eds., 2011).
263. Varon, supra note 219, at 498.
264. 'Id. at 501-02.
265. Id.
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women had the duty to bring their moral beneficence into the public sphere"
urged women to no longer avoid the contentious political arena, but rather
bring their "'shield of purity' ' 266 to protect men and provide fairness,
harmony, and self-control to the public arena.267
After the passage of the Act of 1839, subsequent legislatures broadened
the scope of the women's law in Mississippi.268 The Mississippi legislature
in 1846 allowed married women to contract freely to own and manage
slaves.269 An 1857 bill was passed allowing married women in Mississippi
to enter into contracts for family supplies and necessities, the education of
her children, and for work or labor to be done on her property. 270 Liability
was also limited to the woman's separate estate.271
In Lee v. Bennett,272 the Mississippi Supreme Court construed both the
acts of 1839 and 1846.73 The main issue centered on whether a married
woman had the capacity, "with the consent of her husband, to make a will
of her separate personal estate[.],, 274 The court stated that the acts of 1839
and 1846 "were passed avowedly for the better preservation and protection
of the rights of married women. They enlarge their capacity to acquire and
hold property, real and personal, and are to be regarded strictly in the
character of enabling statutes. ' 275 The court went on to say that it would
"defeat the legislative intention, to give them such a construction as would
abridge, instead of enlarg[e] the rights of married women. 276
Yet the court held that the acts of 1839 and 1846 did not affect the
ability of married women to make wills. 277 The court stated that under the
Mississippi Statute of Wills, 278 the general rule was that married women
were incapable of making wills. 279 An exception did exist which allowed a
married woman, with the consent of her husband, to make a will of personal
property. 280 The court in Lee refused, however, to allow a married woman
to make a will to dispose of her real property.28' The court reasoned that
under interstate succession, the wife's real property would not devolve by
266. Id. at 502-03.
267. Id.
268. See 1846 Miss. Laws 152; 1857 Miss. Laws 336.
269. 1846 Miss. Laws 152.
270. 1857 Miss. Laws 336.
271. Id.
272. Lee v. Bennett, 31 Miss. 119 (Miss. 1856).
273. Id. at 124-25.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 125.
276. Id.
277. Lee, 31 Miss. at 124-27.
278. 1857 Miss. Laws 432.
279. Lee, 31 Miss. at 124-27.
280. Id. at 126-227; West v. West's Executors, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 373, 375 (Va. 1825).
281. Lee, 31 Miss. at 127-28.
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law upon the husband.28 2 The court's concern was that "if the husband, by
his assent, could give legal affect to a devise of her real estate by the wife,
he would be under the strongest possible temptation to control her will, so
as to secure the property for himself to the prejudice of the heir."
283
Although the court in Lee did not expand the rights of married women
to devise their own separate real estate, it is clear that this right was denied
in order to protect the separate estates of married women. 284  The Lee
opinion was written by Cotesworth P. Smith, mentioned above, 285 who,
along with William Sharkey, wrote one of the two Fisher opinions
supporting the property rights of a wife in the Choctaw Tribe.28 6
Cotesworth Smith was a Whig,287 and his sensitivity to the separate rights of
women in both the Fisher and Lee cases seem apparent.288 At a resolution
of the Mississippi Bar, presented by the Honorable T.J. Wharton on
February 23, 1863, Wharton described Smith as "[l]earned, conscientious,
fearless and upright. ,,289
Smith was fearless and upright when he was part of a two-to-one
decision in State v. Johnson,290 in which he wrote the case opinion, joined
by Yerger's concurrence, stating that under the Mississippi Constitution and
laws of the state, a bondholder could sue the state and recover the amount of
principal and interest of the bond.29' Both of these Whig judges knew that
this decision could be the start of their political demise in taking on the
292Democratic Party of Mississippi, which controlled the state government.
B. New York
The New York legislature progressively altered the "'one flesh"'
presumption of the common law with a series of statutes between 1848 and
1884.293 The 1848 statute gave married women in New York the right to
own real and personal property, but it did not give them the right to
294contract. Married women in New York, therefore, owned property that
282. Id.
283. Id. at 126-27.
284. See id
285. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
286. Fisher, 3 Miss. at 615-16.
287. ROWLAND, supra note 244, at 92.
288. See Fisher, 3 Miss. at 615-16; Lee, 31 Miss. at 126-127.
289. ROWLAND, supra note 244, at 93.
290. State v. Johnson, 25 Miss. 625 (Miss. 1853).
291. ld. at 756.
292. Yerger would lose in his next judicial election. See ROWLAND, supra note 244, at 93-94.
293. Judith S. Kaye, Women in Law: The Law Can Change People, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929, 1932
n.13 (1991).
294. 1848 N.Y. Laws 307-08.
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they could not sell or invest.295 The New York legislature passed a statute
in 1849 that amended the separate property section and allowed wives to
convey and devise real and personal property as if they were single.296 The
1849 statute also enabled married women who were beneficiaries of a trust
to petition a judge of the Supreme Court for personal control of her
property.
297
The New York legislature passed a statute in 1850 that protected the
deposits of married women in savings banks. 298 A married female was now
allowed to withdraw her deposits. 299  The act was actually "for the
protection of savings banks ... receiving deposits from married women,"300
but it had the effect of giving a married woman control over her own
savings. 30 1  The legislature in 1851 allowed married women who owned
stock the option to vote for corporate officers in person or by proxy. 30 2 A
father could now bequeath stock to his daughter and remain confident that
she would have voting rights.30 3 This act made all stockholders equal
regardless of sex or marital status.
The New York Earnings Act,305 a legislative response in 1860 to
feminist pressures "allowed a woman to hold property, collect rents,
bargain, sell, and transfer her separate property, and sue or be sued., 30 6 The
act included, for the first time, female wage earners and businesswomen.30 7
Section one restated the provision of the 1848 act that allowed married
women the right to hold their own separate property, but expanded it to
include "that which she acquire[d] by her trade, business, labor or
services, carried on or performed on her sole separate account ....,,308
Section two allowed a woman to keep the earnings of her business or labor
as her sole and separate property, and in addition, allowed her to invest it in
her own name. 309 Section three granted a married woman the power to
295. Id. at 307.
296. 1849 N.Y. Laws 528.
297. Id.




302. 1851 N.Y. Laws 616.
303. See id.
304. See id.
305. 1860N.Y. Laws 157.
306. Kaye, supra note 293, at 1932 n.13. For a complete discussion of the women's rights
movement relating to the Earnings Act of 1860, see Basch, supra note 4, at 162-99.





convey or transfer real property held as separate property, but only with the
consent of her husband.31 0
Sections four, five and six spelled out a procedure whereby a married
woman wishing to convey her separate real estate, but unable to get her
311
husband's consent, could get a court order granting the conveyance.
Section eight provided that any contract made by a married woman, relating
to her own separate property, would not be binding on her husband or his
property. 312 Section nine declared that a married woman could be "the joint
guardian of her children .... , Unfortunately, this opportunity for joint
guardianship was quickly set aside by the New York legislature with an
1862 amendment to the Earnings Act returning legal guardianship solely to
the father.31 4
The New York Courts criticized and strictly interpreted the statutes
passed between 1848 and 1884. For example, in the cases of Yale v.
Dederer (Yale J),315 and Yale v. Dederer (Yale JI),316 the husband offered a
promissory note to the plaintiff in payment for certain cows he wished to
purchase.31 7 The plaintiff required the husband to have his wife also sign
because of the husband's less than stellar credit history.31 8 At the time of
the note signing Mrs. Dederer stated that if her husband could not fulfill the
contract she would. 319 This sentiment was not specifically documented on
the contract. 320 The husband became insolvent and the question became
whether the wife's estate could be charged to satisfy the claim.
321
There was contention in the trial court that there was not sufficient
evidence to establish that the purchase of the cows was in any way a benefit
to the wife.322 The case appeared before the New York Court of Appeals
twice, once in 1858 and again in 1860.323 In 1858, the Court of Appeals
praised the common law and denied the woman the power to contract.32 4
The Court held that the wisdom of the common law was paramount in
310. Id.
311. Id. at 158.
312. 1860 N.Y. Laws 159.
313. Id.
314. 1862 N.Y. Laws 343-44.
315. Yale v. Dederer (Yale 1), 18 N.Y. 265 (N.Y. 1858).
316. Yale v. Dederer (Yale 11), 22 N.Y. 450 (N.Y. 1860).
317. Yale!, 18 N.Y. at 265; Yale H, 22 N.Y. at 450.
318. Yale l, 22 N.Y. at 450.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 451-52.
321. Yale/, 18 N.Y. at 266-67, 281-84.
322. Id. at 265-66.
323. Id at 265; Yale I, 22 N.Y at 450.
324. Yalel, 18 N.Y. at 270-72.
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protecting women and that the woman should not-be granted legal capacity
to contract.325
The Court of Appeals in 1860 also held against Mrs. Dederer's right to
contract.326 The practical result of these rulings was that the Dederers were
not financially bound, but the precedential result was a ruling against the
contractual property rights of women. 327  The Court ruled that the wife
signed the note, but only in her capacity as a surety for her husband.328 The
Court found that none of the consideration went to enhance her own estate
or her own benefit.329 The Court held that for Mrs. Dederer to be financially
responsible, she would have had to clearly express her intentions in writing
on the note.33°
George F. Comstock wrote the lead opinion of the Yale I decision.331
Before becoming a judge, Comstock had been appointed the State
Reporter.332 He also practiced law, and in 1852 he was named the Solicitor
of the United States Treasury under President Millard Fillmore.
333
Comstock became the Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals in
1860. After his presidency, the conservative Whig Fillmore joined the
American Party, as did Comstock.335 The American Party had largely
consisted of the dying conservative wing of the Whig Party.336 Comstock
ran on the American Party ticket for the position of Chief Judge of the New
York Court of Appeals, but by the time his term began, on January 1, 1860,
the American Party had disbanded, so he became a Democrat.337
Comstock, a member of the Episcopal Church, was a conservative who,
like Filmore, "was sharply critical of President Lincoln and the abolitionist
views espoused by the [more progressive] Republicans. 33 8 Samuel Selden,
a lifelong Democrat, was elected to the position of Chief Judge of the New
York Court of Appeals in 1862 and he wrote the Yale II majority
325. Id.
326. Yale 11, 22 N.Y. at 460-61.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 450, 460-61.
329. Yale I, 18 N.Y. at 270.
330. Yale 11, 22 N.Y. at 460-61.
331. Yale I, 18N.Y. at 267.
332. Kernan, supra note 244.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Frank Freidel & Hugh Sidey, Millard Fillmore, WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/millardfillmore (last visited Aug. 9, 2013); Kernan, supra
note 244.
336. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial
Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1136-37 (2010).
337. Kernan, supra note 244; Shugerman, supra note 336, at 1136-37.
338. Kernan, supra note 244; Freidel & Sidey, supra note 335; Alexander Tsesis, A Civil Rights
Approach: Achieving Revolutionary Abolitionism through the Thirteenth Amendment, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1773, 1797 (2006).
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opinion.339 Selden had previously worked as Clerk of Chancery and
practiced law.340 He "approached the Dred Scott3 41 decision from [a] ...
constitutional law [perspective] believing that any State had the right to
secede from the Union., 342 Two years later, when the issue came before the
New York Court of Appeals in People v.'Lemmon,343 Judge Selden
dissented from the Court's decision that sustained the slaves' release. He
reiterated his support for principles of comity, "which should at all times
pervade our inter-state legislation."
344
In Birkbeck v. Ackroyd,345 a husband sued a woolen mill for the wages a
wife had earned through her labor.346 The Court of Appeals ruled that it
was the husband's right to recover for the labor and services of his wife
despite the Earnings Act of 1 860•34 7 "She may still regard her interests and
those of her husband as identical, and allow him to claim and appropriate
the fruits of her labor., 348 The court stated that when the husband and the
wife were living together and both working, the wife had never claimed her
earnings as her separate property. 349 Therefore, the wife's earnings came
under the control of the husband.350 "The bare fact that she performs labor
for third persons, for which compensation is due, does not necessarily
establish that she performed it, under the act of 1860, upon her separate
account.",
351
The Birkbeck decision 352 was penned by Associate Judge Charles
Andrews. Andrews would later become the Chief Judge of the New York
Court of Appeals in 1881. 3 53  He was Mayor of Syracuse, New York,
twice.3 54 A devout Episcopalian, who "for many years ... was a delegate..
• of the Episcopal diocese of Central New York and served as chancellor of
the diocese. 3 55  Episcopal judges, even those who were devout,356 have
339. Murray, supra note 244; Yale 11, 22 N.Y. at 451.
340. Murray, supra note 244.
341. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
342. Murray, supra note 244.
343. 20 N.Y. 562 (1860).
344. Murray, supra note 244 (quoting Lemmon, 20 N.Y. at 644 (Selden, J., dissenting)).
345. Birkbeck v. Ackroyd, 74 N.Y. 356 (1878).
346. Id at 356.
347. Id. at 358.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 358-59
350. Birkbeck, 74 N.Y. at 359.
351. Id. at 358.
352. Id. at 357.
353. Brian Quinn, Andrews Charles, NY COURTS, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/legal-
history-new-york/luminaries-court-appeals/andrews-charles.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2013).
354. Quinn, supra note 353; Mayors of Syracuse, New York, CITY OF SYRACUSE,
http://www.syracuse.ny.us/Mayors ofSyracuse.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
355. Quinn, supra note 353.
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been seemingly split on the political ideological scale. The conservative
Episcopal elite, however, have long controlled the American Episcopal
Church.357 Three of the four New York judges studied, George Comstock,
Charles Andrews, and Robert Earl, were Episcopalian and conservative.358
Andrews was also served as a prosecutor prior to his service as a judge.359
Though a Democrat when the Democratic Party. was the consensus
conservative party in the United States, Andrews shifted his allegiance to
the Republicans later in his life, but he remained conservative.36°
In Bertles v. Nunan361 the New York Court of Appeals continued in its
efforts to limit the impact of the 1860 Earnings Act. In Bertles by virtue of
the rule at common law, the Court of Appeals ruled that a deed to the
husband and wife was taken as tenants by the entirety, giving the husband
control and use of the property during the couple's joint lives.362 The Court
of Appeals held that the 1860 law did not affect the husband's common law
inheritance rights in any way and that a wife's "'general engagements are
absolutely void, and she can bind herself by contract only as she is
expressly authorized to do so by statute.' ' 363 Finally in 1884, the New York
legislature took conclusive action stating that "[a] married woman may
contract to the same extent, with like effect and in the same form, as if
,,364unmarried, and she and her separate estate shall be liable thereon ....
Another Democratic judge, who also happened to be Episcopalian,
wrote the Bertles majority opinion.365 As a young lawyer, "Judge Earl was
active in ...politics and public affairs .. .acquir[ing] the Herkimer
Democrat, a weekly conservative political newspaper .... ,,366 He became
its sole editor and publisher in 1849.367 After retirement from the bench, the
New York Democratic Party offered him the nomination to be the party's
356. See generally Thomas C. Berg & William G. Ross, Some Religiously Devout Justices:
Historical Notes and Comments, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 383, 400 n.76 (1998); Daniel D. Blinka, The Roots
of the Modern Trial. Greenleaf s Testimony to the Harmony of Christianity, Science, and Law in
Antebellum America, 27 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 293, 302-03 (2007).
357. Custer, supra note 209, at 22; Eugene C. Bianchi, John XXIII, Vatican I and American
Catholicism, 387 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 30, 36 (1970).
358. See supra note 338 and accompanying text; see also Quinn, supra note 353; New York State
Bar Ass'n, Obituary, Robert Earl, 26 PROC. OF THE N.Y. ST. B.A. 475 (1903).
359. Quinn, supra note 353.
360. Id.
361. 92 N.Y. 152 (N.Y. 1883).
362. Id. at 166.
363. Ranney, supra note 164, at 528-29 (citing Bertles, 92 N.Y. at 160.)
364. 1884N. Y. Laws 381.
365. Robert Earl, supra note 358, at 475.
366. Benigno, supra note 244.
367. Id.
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gubernatorial candidate in 1894 and 1898.368 Earl turned down both
nominations, not wishing to become politically active again.369
C. Oregon
Brummet v. Weaver was an important case decided by the Oregon
Supreme Court after the passage of the Oregon Donation Land Claim
Act.370  With money from the sale of her donation act claim, Sarah
Brummet purchased and registered three horses as her separate property in
1861.371 She later divorced Mr. Brummet, but then remarried him. 372 On
remarriage she did not re-register her horses.373 Her husband unilaterally
sold the horses later to Mr. Weaver. Sarah sued to recover possession.374
The Oregon Supreme Court held that the divorce revoked the registration of
the horses, but noted that
under [the constitution] no woman loses any pecuniary rights by
marriage. Whatever property a woman has at the time of marriage,
or afterwards acquired by gift, devise, or inheritance, remains hers,
until she, by her own consent, express or implied, parts with it.
Without that consent she cannot be divested of her title to it,
whether registered or not.
375
The court stated that actual or constructive notice of the wife's
ownership was enough to bind the other party.376 The court remanded the
case for a new trial, stating that she managed her property well which
should bode her well on retrial.377 The court on retrial correctly interpreted
the Oregon Constitution, which in 1859 had done away with coverture.
Sarah, as a married woman, had the authority "to sell any part of her
separate property and retain the purchase money as her own; or with it to
buy other property to be held by her in the same manner and for the same
purpose.378
Erasmus Shattuck, Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court, wrote
the majority opinion in Brummet.379 Shattuck, who was born and raised in
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Brummet v. Weaver, 2 Or. 168 (Or. 1866).
371. Id.
372. Id. at 172.
373. Id. at 168, 172.
374. Id. at 168, 173-74.
375. Brummet, 2 Or. at 173.
376. Id. at 168, 173.
377. Id. at 173-74.
378. Id. at 171.
379. Id. at 170.
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Vermont, having graduated from Vermont University in 1848, served as a
prosecutor in the role of United States District Attorney for one year before
380becoming a judge. Shattuck was a member of the Whig party until it
disbanded in 1860, right before the outbreak of the Civil War.38 He then
became a member of the Republican Party.382 Later in his life he was
associated politically with the Democratic Party, but he never did become a
member, and he was not thought to be particularly partisan, but rather more
of an independent thinker, finding fault with the platforms of the various
political parties.383
The strongest response to the Brummert decision came from creditors
who were worried about "their ability to collect on contracts and securities
agreements involving separately-held property. 384  Almost immediately,
the Oregon legislature passed a new provision that effectively reversed the
Brummert decision by requiring that all married women's personal property
be registered.385 The act protected the husband's creditors by including a
prima facie presumption that all unregistered personal property belonged to
the husband.386
In the 1872 case Frarey v. Wheeler,387 the Oregon Supreme Court held
that the Oregon Donation Claims Act and the Oregon Constitution referred
only to the holding of property and not to its disposition.388 In 1867, Mr.
and Mrs. Wheeler agreed to sell Mrs. Jemima Wheeler's donation claim to
Mr. Frarey.389 The contract provided that Frarey would pay twenty dollars,
gain immediate possession, and, upon payment of an additional $380 one
year later be given title.390 Frarey took until August of 1870 to tender the
money with accrued interest. 391 Frarey made permanent improvements on
the land during this time, but the Wheelers declined payment and refused to
execute the deed. Frarey sued for specific performance.392
The Oregon Supreme Court in Frarey held that Jemima Wheeler's
contract to sell her donation claim was invalid.393 Although the decision
380. HISTORY OF PORTLAND, OREGON: WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF
PROMINENT CITIZENS AND PIONEERS 514-15 (H.W. Scott ed., 1890).
381. Id. at 516; JOHN F. BIBBY & BRIAN F. SCHAFFNER, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND ELECTIONS IN
AMERICA 50 (6th ed. 2007).
382. HISTORY, supra note 380, at 516.
383. Id.
384. Scott, supra note 24, at 446.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. 4Or. 190 (Or. 1871).
388. Id. at 195-96.
389. Id. at 190-91.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Frarey, 4 Or. at 190-91.
393. Id. at 194.
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was in favor of the Wheelers, the wider impact restricted women's ability to
contract to sell separate property. 394 This was a clear step back from the
more progressive Brummert decision.395 The Frarey case stated that "at
common law married women are not only held incompetent to enter into
covenants to convey their real estate, but they are classified with those who
are under disability to make any contract whatever...."396
The Oregon Supreme Court had moved back to the more paternalistic
approach that many courts had taken in regard to married women's property
rights in the nineteenth century. 397 "If Brummert were applied, the court
could easily have found that Jemima had gained the right to covenant with
regard to her land via the 1859 constitution, and held in favor of Mr.
Frarey. 39s
The Frarey decision was written by a strong Democrat, Benjamin
Bonham. 399 Bonham, a member of the Methodist Episcopal Church, served
both locally and nationally on the Democratic Party.400 Before he became a
judge, he worked as a schoolteacher and superintendent, he practiced law,
and he was a Democratic representative in the Oregon legislature. 401 After
Bonham retired from the bench, President Grover Cleveland, a Democrat,
appointed him to the position of Consulate-General to British India, a very
notable position at that time in history.4 °2
In 1872, the Oregon legislature responded to Frarey by enacting
another married women's property act.40 3 The 1872 act brought back a
married woman's rights established in Brummert, but went even further in
stating that property acquired by a woman's own labor should also be
regarded as her separate property.40 4
The Rugh v. Ottenheimer opinion once again had the state supreme
court moving in harmony with its constitution.40 5 Nancy Rugh purchased a
160-acre farm one year before her marriage with money from the sale of her
donation claim.4 °6 The deed was not delivered until after her marriage.40 7
394. See id.
395. Compare id. at 197 (restricting women to sell separate property via contract), with Brummet,
2 Or. at 174 (expressing a more open view).
396. Frarey, 4 Or. at 195.
397. Scott, supra note 24, at 447-49.
398. Id. at 447; Frarey, 4 Or. at 194.
399. JOSEPH GASTON, PORTRAIT AND BIOGRAPHICAL RECORD OF THE WILLAMETrE VALLEY,





403. Chused, supra note 7, at 29.
404. Id.
405. 6 Or. 231 (Or. 1877).
406. ld. at231-33.
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Later she agreed to trade the land for some land owned by Mr. Gardner,
who ended up defying her wishes and deeding the land to her husband,
William Hugh.40 8 Her husband promised to deed the land to Nancy, but
never did. Eventually her husband abandoned Nancy, leaving behind a
number of creditors.40 9
The Oregon Supreme Court held that the Oregon Constitution "operated
... to cut off the husband's common-law rights in his wife's property..
S,,410 Even though the transaction in question occurred before 1859,411 the
year that Oregon became a state with a new constitution,412 all property
owned by married women when the Oregon Constitution went into effect
was freed from the common law control of their husbands.1 3 The court in
Rugh ruled that the husband's limited interest in his wife's land "was the
right to enjoy the rents and profits during their joint lives, and the right of
curtesy (in case of issue born alive) after her death.
' 4 14
Judge Rueben Boise wrote the Rugh decision for the Oregon Supreme
Court.415 Boise, after passing the bar and prior to his service on the bench
had been both a practicing and prosecuting attorney and legislator.41 6 Judge
Boise's political leanings were described in a portrait and biographical
account written in 1903.417  "During his voting days the judge was a
Douglas Democrat, but after the war subscribed to the principles of the
Republican Party. ' 4"8 Boise's progressive approach is represented in the
following:
He was always in the forefront of those who advocated the
extension of greater legal rights to women and while in the
constitutional convention he worked effectively for the adoption of
provisions which put a wife upon the same condition before the law
as her husband. His decisions in matters relating to property and
407. Id. at 232.
408. Id. at 231-33
409. Id
410. William Maohofsky, Comment, Community-Property Law - Constitutionality, 27 OR. L. REV.
301, 317 (1948).
411. Rugh, 6 Or. at231-32.
412. See Oregon History: Statehood, OREGON BLUE BOOK,
http://www.bluebook.state.or.us/cultural/history/historyl5.htm (last visited May 6, 2014).
413. Maohofsky, supra note 410, at 317.
414. Rugh, 6 Or. at 233.
415. Id.
416. Oregon Historical Soc'y, Two of Oregon's Foremost Commonwealth Builders: Judge Reuben
Patrick Boise and Professor Thomas Condon, Q. OR. HIST. SOC'y 201,201-04 (1907).
417. GASTON, supra note 399, at 209.
418. Id. at 210.
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contract rights of married women showed an inclination in this
direction.419
Of all the judges studied in the paper, Boise was the only judge writing
a majority or concurring opinion that had actually been appointed by an
executive.42 °  Boise was actually appointed twice.42' In 1857, he was
appointed to the Oregon Territorial Supreme Court by Democratic President
James Buchanan.422 In 1878 he was appointed again to the Oregon
Supreme Court by Democratic Governor W.W. Thayer.423  Boise was a
conundrum being a progressive judge that appealed to Democrats also. If
more judges had been appointed in this study, as opposed to elected, and the
proxy version of the attitudinal model was employed, there would not be a
positive correlation with Rueben Boise's appointments.
Soon after the Rugh decision, the Oregon legislature adopted another
married women's property act in 1878.424 This act permitted married
women the right to manage, transfer, and write wills. 425  The act also
designated a wife's wages as her own, and allowed married women to sue
and be sued.426 The act also stated that neither spouse was liable for the
other's debts, except for family expenses and education.4 27
Another act passed in 1880 stated "[a]ll laws which impose or recognize
civil disabilities upon a wife which are not imposed or recognized as
existing as to the husband, are hereby repealed .,,428 This act gave
married women equal rights and responsibilities as to child custody.42
9
Chused stated it well in regard to the 1878 and 1880 acts: "These two
statutes represent a watershed in the development of Oregon's married
women's property law. For the first time, married women's property was to
be treated the same as their husbands' assets. 430
419. Reuben P. Boise Biography, supra note 225.
420. Judicial History, OREGON JUDICIAL DEP'T,
http://courts.oregon.gov/Yamhill/pages/judicial-history.aspx. (last visited Aug. 7, 2013).
421. Id.
422. Id; James Buchanan, WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/Jamesbuchanan (last visited May 4, 2014).
423. Judicial History, supra note 438; William W. Thayer Biography, STATE OF OREGON LAW
LIBRARY, - http://www.oregon.gov/SOLL/Pages/ojdhistoryjustice-biographies/w-w-thayerbio.aspx
(last visited May 4, 2014).
424. THE STATE OF OREGON, THE LAWS OF OREGON; AND THE RESOLUTIONS AND MEMORIALS OF
THE TENTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY THEREOF 92 (W.B. Carter, State Printer,
1878).
425. Id.
426. Id. at 93.
427. Id.
428. An Act to Establish and Protect the Rights of Married Women, 1880 Or. Laws § 1.
429. Id.
430. Chused, supra note 7, at 34.
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V. JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY
Table One below depicts four Whigs, including one that became a
Republican after the Whig Party disbanded. 43' There are five members of
the more conservative Democratic Party and one judge who can be labeled a
Republican.432 For the purposes of this study and the attitudinal model, the
Whigs and the Republican can be lumped together and be predicted to have
ruled more liberally, acting either to support or recognize the married
women's property acts as authority.433 The Democrats, on the other hand,
can be predicted to have ruled conservatively, or against supporting the
married women's property acts.434
The two Mississippi Judges, William L. Sharkey and Cotesworth P.
Smith, who wrote the two opinions in Fisher were both Whigs. 435 Justice
William Yerger who wrote the opinion in Ratcliffe case to Cotesworth P.
Smith's majority, was also a Whig.436 Ratcliffe upheld the act and left the
subject as it stood before in equity.437 Cotesworth P. Smith also wrote the
Lee opinion, giving homage to the 1839 and 1846 acts stating that they
"were passed avowedly for the better preservation and protection of the
rights of married women.
4 38
Erasmus Shattuck, the Oregon judge who was a Whig until the party
disbanded and then became a Republican, also ruled for married women's
property acts like the three Whigs from Mississippi. 439 Shattuck penned the
majority opinion in the Brummert case that correctly interpreted the
constitutional clause that effectively eliminated coverture and supported
women's property rights.44° In Rugh, the Oregon Supreme Court held that
the Oregon Constitution operated to cut off the husband's common law
rights in his wife's property.441 The opinion was written by Rueben Boise,
the Douglas Democrat turned Republican, who was also a women's rights
advocate.442
In tallying the Democrat's votes look no further than the two Yale
decisions decided in New York.443 -George F. Comstock wrote the Yale I
431. See infra Table 1.
432. See supra notes 417-418 and accompanying text (identifying Rueben Boise to be a Douglas
Democrat, but he switched to being a Republican after the Civil War); GASTON, supra note 399, at 210.
433. See, e.g., Fisher, 3 Miss. at 611; Ratcliffe, 24 Miss. at 181.
434. See, e.g., Birkbeck, 74 N.Y. at 356; Bertles, 92 N.Y. at 152.
435. Fisher, 3 Miss. at 611,614; supra notes 94, 103, 287 and accompanying text.
436. Ratcliffe, 24 Miss. at 182, 185; supra note 259-261 and accompanying text.
437. Ratcliffe, 24 Miss. at 181, 185.
438. Lee, 31 Miss. at 125.
439. See supra notes 381-382 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Brummet, 2 Or. at 168.
440. Brummet, 2 Or. at 170.
441. Rugh, 6 Or. at 236.
442. Id. at 231; GASTON, supra note 399, at 210.
443. Yale !, 18 N.Y. at 285; Yale 11, 22 N.Y at 460-61.
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opinion.444 He was a member of the conservative American Party when he
ran for election in the New York Court of Appeals in 1860.44 5 By the time
he actually took office in 1861, he had become a member of the Democratic
Party due to the disbandment of the American Party.44 6 Samuel Selden, a
lifetime conservative Democrat, wrote the Yale II case.447 Two more
conservative Democratic judges, Charles Andrews and Robert Earl, both of
New York, penned the Birkbeck and Bertles cases respectively. 448 The last
of the five Democrats, Benjamin Bonham from Oregon was a strong
conservative who wrote the majority opinion in Frarey.
449
There was a significant party ideological distinction for the ten judges
surveyed.450 The Whig and Republican judges ruled to support the married
women's property acts 100% of the time.451 The Democratic judges, on the
other hand, ruled against supporting the married women's property acts
100% of the time.452 With only ten judges' ruling information tabulated,
this result cannot be considered dispositive, but it can be considered more
than anecdotal. It may be a clue to the positive role that party ideology may
have played amongst nineteenth century judges.
The personal attributes model examines a judge's biographical data to
determine if there are any attributes present that may explain why a judge
ruled on a particular legal topic as he did.453 The political party of a judge
has been examined as an attribute that may have an influence.454  The
politics of the ten judges has already been explored above in considering the
attitudinal model. 4  In regard to the personal attributes model, there was a
positive correlation between the five members of the more historically
liberal parties of the nineteenth century, the Whigs and Republicans, ruling
progressively to support or recognize the married women's property acts.
456
The Democratic judges, likewise, represented a positive correlation in ruling
conservatively to not recognize the authority of the passed married women's
property acts.457
444. Yale/, 18 N.Y. at 267
445. Keman, supra note 244.
446. Id.
447. Yale II, 22 N.Y at 450; see supra note 339 and accompanying text.
448. Birkbeck, 74 N.Y. at 356; Bertles, 92 N.Y. at 166; see supra note 358 and accompanying text.
449. Frarey, 4 Or. at 193; see supra notes 392-398 and accompanying text.
450. See infra notes 451-457 and accompanying text.
451. See supra Part IV.
452. See supra Part IV.
453. NIALL BOLGER ET AL., PERSONS IN CONTEXT: DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESSES 30 (2007).
454. Tate, supra note 234, at 355.
455. See supra Part IV.
456. See supra Parts IV-V.
457. See supra Parts IV-V.
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Other scholars analyzing the personal attributes model hold out religion
as a possible influence on how judges make decisions.458 Some believe a
systematic difference exists in how judges decide depending on their
religious affiliation.459 Jewish justices, for example, have been viewed by
some to decide for the underdog because of their own historical outsider
status. 46 0 Despite various conservative rules governing the Roman Catholic
Church, there is the thinking that American Catholics are more liberal than
most non-American Catholics. 46' Evangelical judges are generally thought
462to be conservative.
Episcopalians, along with Methodists, Presbyterians, and
Congregationalists (more recently the United Church of Christ) are
Protestant denominations that have been associated with liberal
Protestantism since the early nineteenth century.463 The Episcopal Church
also has a very strong conservative wing, which has yielded great
influence.464 Table One below indicates four identified Episcopalians
among the ten judges; George Comstock, Charles Andrews, Robert Earl
from New York, and Benjamin Bonham from Oregon.465  All ruled
conservatively against recognizing the married women's property acts.466
Erasmus Shattuck from Oregon was identified as a Christian, but his
membership in a particular denomination or sect is unknown.46 7 There was
no religious membership information available on the five other judges. If
the four Episcopalian judges happened to be members of the conservative
wing of the Episcopal Church, as was Charles Andrews, 468 there would be a
positive correlation amid the very small sample.469
458. Tracey George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIz. L. REV. 9, 13-14 (2001); Paula J. Lundberg, State
Courts and School Funding: A Fifty-State Analysis, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1101, 1115-16 (2000); Rick A.
Swanson & Albert P. Melone, The Partisan Factor and Judicial Behavior in the Illinois Supreme Court,
19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 303, 307-08 (1995).
459. Brian H. Bornstein & Monica K. Miller, Does a Judge's Religion Influence Decision
Making?, 45 J. AM. JUDGES ASS'N 112, 113 (2009); Scott C. Idleman, The Role of Religious Values in
Judicial Decision Making, 68 IND. L.J. 433, 433 (1993).
460. ROBERT A. BURT, Two JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED LAND 3-4 (1990).
461. Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the US. Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 491, 498 (1975).
462. Stephen M. Feldman, Empiricism, Religion, and Judicial Decision-Making, 15 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 43, 48-49 (2006).
463. See A COMPANION To AMERICAN THOUGHT 394 (Richard Wightman Fox & James T.
Kloppenberg eds., 1995).
464. See supra notes 356-360 and accompanying text.
465. See infra Table 1.
466. See Yale 1, 18 N.Y. at 270; Birkbeck, 74 N.Y. at 358; Bertles, 92 N.Y. at 160; Frarey, 4 Or. at
194.
467. HISTORY, supra note 380, at 515.
468. See supra notes 352-360 and accompanying text.
469. See infra Table 1.
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Prior work experience is another personal attribute that some scholars
have found to influence how judges vote.470 Corey Rayburn Yung has
tested particular attributes and their potential effect on contemporary
Federal Circuit judges and has discovered that a judge's prior work
experience in the government (outside of the judiciary and elected office)
will tend to indicate a liberal voting preference.47' How well Yung's results
correlate to state Supreme Court judges from the nineteenth century is
discussed below.472
Only one of the ten judges in the study had the attribute of government
work experience in his biographical data; George Comstock.473 Comstock
was a high level government official in both the New York and federal
governments. He was appointed New York State Reporter, and also the
Solicitor of the United States Treasury under President Millard Fillmore.474
There was not a positive correlation because Comstock did not rule liberally
on married women's property acts.475
Another prior work experience attribute that has been explored is that
between twentieth century federal court judges who served as prosecutors
and later ruling conservatively on the bench.476 The correlation is not
supported in this study. There were four nineteenth century state Supreme
Court judges who had previously been prosecutors: Cotesworth Smith of
Mississippi, Charles Andrews of New York, and both Erasmus Shattuck and
Rueben Boise of Oregon.477 Only Judge Andrews ruled conservatively on
married women's property acts.478
Other personal attributes considered in this study of the nineteenth
century judges were region and area of the country in which the judge was
born and raised. Neither attribute showed any type of relationship between
the judges and the attribute. Of the attributes studied, the judges' political
party membership had a positive correlation for all ten judges. Religion
held a positive correlation for the four Episcopalian judges, assuming they
were all of the conservative wing of the religion.
470. See, e.g., Corey Rayburn Yung, Judged By the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of
the Ideologies of Judges on the United Stat~s Court ofAppeals, 51 B.C. L. REV. 133, 1188 (2010); Tate,
supra note 235, at 359-63.
471. Yung, supra note 470, at 1133.
472. See infra notes 473-475.
473. See infra Table I.
474. See supra notes 332-333 and accompanying text.
475. See supra notes 331-337 and accompanying text; see also Yale 1, 18 N.Y. at 270.
476. Tate, supra note 235, at 359-63.
477. See supra notes 285, 359, 380, 416 and accompanying text.
478. See Birkbeck, 74 N.Y. at 358.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The social reform movement of the 1830s had many causes, one being
the passage of married women's property rights. 479 Freidman identified
married women's property acts as evolving piecemeal efforts in the
nineteenth century.480 Chused categorized and indexed them into three
waves.48' The first wave of statutes was passed primarily in the later 1830s
and 1840s, and dealt with the need to free married women's estates from the
debts of their husbands.48 2 Most of these statutes were motivated by the
Panic of 1837 and the subsequent depression.48 3
The Panic of 1837 most likely did have an influence upon the
Mississippi legislature. The bill's sponsor, Senator T.B.J. Hadley, was
trying to shield his own wife from the debts of her trustee and himself.
48 4
Hadley's bill, combined with the Fisher case, laid the foundation for the
passage of the first married women's property act in a state that many would
consider a surprising locale. Mississippi is a state where the "Law of the
Creator ' 485 and its various tenets have been a prevailing sentiment
throughout its less-than-progressive history.486 While the social reform
movement had an impact on the passage of married women's property acts
in the 1800s, it is hard to say how much of an influence it had specifically
on antebellum Mississippi, where the economy was based on industrial-
driven cotton and slave labor.487
The second wave. . ., beginning in the [late] 1840s and ending after
the Civil War, dealt with the ability of married women to hold
separate estates. [Some of these state acts] were ... an attempt to
eradicate the inconsistencies that had arisen between common law
488and equity.
479. See supra Parts II-lI.
480. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
481. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
482. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
483. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
484. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
485. Deborah M. Thaw, The Feminization of the Office of Notary Public: From Feme Covert to
Notaire Covert, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 703, 721 (1998). "Law of the Creator" is a strong sentiment
that has had a history of significant influence, particularly in the United States South. It means that the
"paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother." Id.
486. Id.
487. Eugene R. Dattel, Cotton in a Global Economy: Mississippi (1800-1860), Miss. HISTORY
Now, http://mshistorynow.mdah.state.ms.us/articles/161/cotton-in-a-global-economy-mississippi- 1800-
1860 (last visited Aug. 15, 2013).
488. Kathleen M. O'Connor, Marital Property Reform in Massachusetts: A Choice for the New
Millennium, 34 NEw ENG. L. REV. 261, 292 (1999).
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The New York acts of 1848 and 1849 receive much credit for
influencing the rest of the country on the right of married women to hold
separate estates. 489 The New York statutes, however, as discussed above
were severely restricted by the New York Courts. The New York Courts
were very dilatory in letting go of the English common law, which favored
the husband.490
The third wave acts passed primarily after the Civil War, and were
designed to protect married women's -earnings from coverture. 4 9 ' The
Oregon Territory was very motivated to attract settlers to the Northwest,
and one of its main incentives was the Donation Land Claim Act.4 9 2 The
1850 Federal Territorial Act was not what placed Oregon into the third
wave, but it helped provide a path toward a debtor exemption provision that
was later embedded in the state's 1857 constitution.4 93
The property and pecuniary rights of every married woman, at the
time of marriage, or afterwards, acquired by gift, devise, or
inheritance, shall not be subject to the debts, or contracts of the
husband; and laws shall be passed providing for the registration of
the wife's separate property.
494
The reactions of the three studied states' Supreme Court judiciaries to
the passage of the married women's property acts were varied. Analyzing
the judicial ideologies of the various judges who wrote the majority
opinions for the cases discussed in this paper may provide some clues.
Table One below illustrates the findings from researching the biographical
information available on the judges who wrote the majority opinions.495
This study does demonstrate that judges were voting for married
women's property acts early on.4 96 Even though the number of studied
judges was just ten, the use of the attitudinal and personal attributes models
showed a strong positive correlation between the political party the judges
were members of and how the judges decided in regard to married women's
489. See Ray August, The Spread of Community-Property Law to the Far West, 3 W. LEG. HIST.
35, 45-47, 61 (1990); see 1848 N.Y. Laws 307; 1849 N.Y. Laws 528.
490. Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to
Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2149-57 (1994).
491. See Chused, supra note 16, at 1398-99.
492. See supra notes 171-174 and accompanying text.
493. See OR. CONST., art. XV, § 5 (1857).
494. Id.
495. See infra Table 1.
496. See generally, Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev.
4 (1936); Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to
Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 Geo. L.J. 2127, 2149-57 (1994).
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property acts.497 The personal attributes model also displayed that religion
may be a factor in how judges voted.498
Chused classified the acts but did not provide an explanation for their
creation or a "why" for their passage and subsequent court support.499 I
borrow from the political scientist literature and suggest that the political
affiliations of the majority decision makers and their religious convictions
discussed here provide an explanation as to why the judges voted as they
did. This explanation is not based on a legal theory, but rather a political
science theory. I also contend that further research on the states'
legislatures is also needed which will arguably be even more telling as to
the explanation for the passage.
Some may argue that applying political science judicial behavior
literature to married women's property cases is unconvincing. In analyzing
my paper, some may argue that the ten judges that I found bibliographic
information on are not representative of the larger population of state
appellate judges at the time. In addition, some may argue that the probative
characteristics of judges in the 20th century studies may not be applicable to
judges of the 19th century.
In answering these imagined criticisms, first, I could find biographical
information on all of the majority opinion writers. Did I find biographical
information on these judges because they were the better judges of their day
and more renowned for their judicial acumen? I suggest that these judges
were representative of the notable, better followed state appellate judges of
that time. I further contend that because these judges produced more
noteworthy case law, they are more likely to be the recipients of
biographical coverage at this early period in our country's history.
Second, anytime you pair studies from different centuries there will be
potential time associated issues. One way to account for this is to look at
the underlying factors affecting the characteristics. For example, the Whig
and Republican administrations in both Federal and state government
positions in the 19th century can be compared favorably to the more liberal
New Deal and Great Society run administrations of the 20th century.
Similarly, in regard to government service one could correlate the liberal
nature of the New Deal to the more progressive Lincoln administration.
Future research should focus upon the legislative behavior that was
involved in passing these acts. While beyond the scope of this paper,
analyzing the voting behavior of the actual legislators who passed the acts,
juxtaposed against their personal attributes, may offer a deeper explanation.
497. See generally supra Parts IV-V.
498. See generally supra Parts IV-V.
499. See generally, Chused, supra note 16.
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TABLE ONE: JUDGES' BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
Judge State/Region Party Born Religion Prosecutor Work
Law




Cotesworth Mississippi Whig South Carolina Unknown Yes practice
Smith &
Legislator
William Mississippi Whig Tennessee Unknown No Law
Yerger practice
Law
George New York Amer./ New York Episcopal No practice &
Comstock Democrat State and
Federal
Samuel Law
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Law
Benjamin Oregon Democrat Tennessee Episcopal No practice
Bonham &
Super. of
Ruebin Oregon Democrat/ Massachusetts Unknown Yes Law
Boise Repub. Practice
& Legislator
